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"Related" Claims Of Unfair Competition
And Patent Infringement
River Brand Rice Mills, Inc. v. General Foods Corp.'
In an action for patent infringement relating to quick cooking rice,
the plaintiff alleged infringement of four patents by the defendant. In
addition he alleged a claim of unfair competition arising out of misappropriation of trade secrets by defendant and a former employee,
now employed by defendant corporation.2 The trade secrets were3
alleged to be unpatented improvements of the patented processs.
Defendant contended that the district court lacked jurisdiction over
the unfair competition claim. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b), 4 unfair
competition is a non-federal claim and can be raised in a federal court
only if it is "related" to the federal claim of patent infringement;
defendant argued that the unfair competition claim here was not
"related" within the contemplation of § 1338(b). 5
The district court overruled defendant's motion to dismiss the
unfair competition claim and defendant took an interlocutory appeal.
The U.S. Court of Appeals, affirming the district court, decided that
at this point it could not be said as a matter of law that the federal
and non-federal complaints were not related within the purview of
§ 1338(b). The district court was instructed to consider whatever
53. Leflar was perhaps unduly cautious in remarking, "In later years it will be
easy to merge the ideas of 'significant relationship' and 'governmental interests' . . .
it may be assumed that 'grouping of contacts' does not mean mere counting of contacts,
that qualitative rather than quantitative evaluation determines the 'most significant
relationship'. Qualitative evaluation is inevitably in terms of policies and interests,
the policies and interests that appear important to the evaluator." Leflar, Comments
on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 COL. L. Rtv. 1247, 1248 (1963). Arguably, this is a fair
statement of what the courts appear to be doing already.
1. 334 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1964).
2. The employee was in the employment of the plaintiff and thereafter became an
employee of the defendant corporation. He was made a defendant by an amendment.
3. See Great Lakes Carbon Corp. v. Continental Oil Co., 219 F. Supp. 468, 503
(D.W.D. La. 1963), motion denied, 332 F.2d 588 (1964); O'Brien v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 293 F.2d 1, 12 (3d Cir. 1961), both of which upheld actions brought
upon an unpatented invention.
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1958) states as follows: "The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action asserting a claim of unfair competition when
joined with a substantial and related claim under the copyright, patent or trademark
laws." (Emphasis added.)
5. See Revisers' Notes, H.R. ReP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1948).
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evidence it deemed necessary to determine whether the patent infringement and unfair competition claims were related. Although the Court
of Appeals did not decide whether the claims were related, it expressly
stated that the term "related" should be liberally construed. Section
1338(b), in which this term appears, was a legislative response to the
restrictive approach to the pendant jurisdiction rule spelled out in
Hum v. Oursler.' The center of controversy in River Brand Rice,
and the subject which this Note will consider, is the extent if any
to which the rule in Hum has been liberalized by § 1338(b).
Prior to the Hum case, in Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.,1
the Supreme Court decided that once the federal court obtained jurisdiction through the raising of a substantial federal question, the court
then had the right to decide all non-federal questions involved. Subsequently, two lines of authority developed for determining the extent
to which federal jurisdiction, based on a federal question, could be
exercised over non-federal claims joined with related federal claims.'
One line of authority stated that if a substantial federal question were
raised, the jurisdiction of the federal courts immediately extended to all
other claims in issue, even though the decision completely ignored the
federal question involved.' Another line of authority took a narrower
view of the scope of federal jurisdiction. The applicable rule adopted
by courts applying the narrow approach varied in each federal circuit,1"
but basic to the narrow approach was the idea that the assertion of an
alleged "federal right" did not of itself entitle the court to jurisdiction
over the non-federal claim.
The lack of harmony in the two lines of authority was recognized
in Hurn," which involved a federal statutory claim of copyright infringement and a non-federal claim of unfair competition for plagiarism.
The Court, after examining the two divergent views, concluded that the
more liberal interpretation was the principle to be followed.'" It
6. 289 U.S. 238 (1933).

7.213 U.S. 175 (1909).
8. See Note, 40 HARV. L. Rev. 298 (1928).
9. Bohler v. Callaway, 267 U.S. 479, 489 (1925) ; Chicago Great Western Railway
Co. v. Kendall, 266 U.S. 94, 97 (1924) ; David v. Wallace, 257 U.S. 478, 482 (1922);
Cann v. Ringee, 32 F.2d 639 (6th Cir. 1929).
10. 1 U. CM. L. Rxv. 480, 482 n.11 (1934). This extensive footnote thoroughly
documents the case law development.
The Second Circuit cases restricted federal jurisdiction to the greatest extent; the
majority of them agreed that the federal court was without power to hear the claim
of unfair competition, no matter how closely related it was to the claim of infringement. See, e.g., Hutchinson, Pierce & Co. v. Lowery, 163 Fed. 42 (2d Cir. 1908).
Some decisions seemed to take the view that the court has jurisdiction, at least where
the non-federal questions are "intertwined" with the federal question, but could in its
discretion refuse to exercise that jurisdiction. See, e.g., Mallison v. Ryan, 242 Fed. 951
(S.D.N.Y. 1917). Another line of cases would refuse jurisdiction of the claim of
unfair competition on the theory it presented a separate cause of action, although it
was not always clear that was true. See, e.g., U.S. Expansion Bolt Co. v. H. G.
Groncke Hardware Co., 234 Fed. 868 (7th Cir. 1916). A further variation was
presented by a group of cases which would permit proof of unfair competition as an
element in the damages plaintiff had suffered through the infringement. See, e.g.,
Ludwigs v. Payson Mfg. Co., 206 Fed. 60 (7th Cir. 1913). Other courts have adopted
a variation of the above and require an "aggravation of damages" in considering the
unfair competition questions. See, e.g., Sprigg v. Fisher, 222 Fed. 964 (D. Md. 1915).
11. 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
12. Id. at 245.
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formulated a test differentiating a single cause of action based upon
two separate grounds from two joined but separate causes of action:
"A cause of action does not consist of facts, but of the unlawful
violation of a right which the facts show. The number and variety
of the facts alleged do not establish more than one cause of action
so long as their result, whether they be considered severally or in
combination, is the violation of but one right by a single legal
wrong [as stated in Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316
(1927) ]..,,3

The court in Hurn applied the above test to the case before it and
found that the claims of copyright infringement and unfair competition
were not separate causes of action, but different grounds in support of
the same cause of action.' 4 However, the infringement and unfair
competition claims alleged in Hurn rested upon substantially identical
facts, and most of the subsequent cases relied upon this identity of
claims to limit the broad pendant jurisdiction rule spelled out in Hum.
These cases limited Hurn to its specific fact situation and refused to
entertain jurisdiction over the non-federal claim of unfair competition
unless it rested upon the "same' ' 1 5 or "substantially identical"' 6 facts
as the federal claim. There was, however, some support for a more
liberal approach to the application of pendant jurisdiction,
and those
17
cases required only a "substantial overlapping of proof.'
Section 1338(b)' 8 was drafted by the Revisers to give Congressional approval of the decision of the Supreme Court in Hurn v.
Oursler and to codify that decision as statutory law.' 9 The Revisers
stated their reasons for the enactment of § 1338(b) in the Revisers'
Notes:
"Subsection (b) . . . is intended to avoid 'piecemeal' litigation

to enforce common-law and statutory copyright, patent and trademark rights by specifically permitting such enforcement in a single
civil action in the district court. While this is the rule under
Federal decisions, this section would enact it as statutory authority.
The problem is discussed at length in Hurn v. Oursler .. .and in

13. Id. at 246.
14. See Note, 52 HARV. L. Rtv. 697 (1939), for an early treatment of the single
cause of action.
15. See, e.g., Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
16. See, e.g., Dubil v. Rayford Camp & Co., 184 F.2d 899, 901 (9th Cir. 1950)
French Renovating Co. v. Ray Renovating Co., 170 F.2d 945, 947 (6th Cir. 1948)
Zalkind v. Scheinman, 139 F.2d 895, 901-02 (2d Cir. 1943) ; Musher Foundation, Inc.
v. Alba Trading Co., 127 F.2d 9, 10 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 217 U.S. 641 (1942) :
Lewis v. Vendome Bags, Inc., 108 F.2d 16-18 (2d Cir. 1939) ; Armstrong Paint and
Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U.S. 315 (1938).
17. This view is best illustrated by Judge Clark in a series of dissents, Kleinman
v. Betty Dain Creations, Inc., 189 F.2d 546, 549 (2d Cir. 1951), and Musher Foundation, Inc. v. Alba Trading Co., 127 F.2d 9, 11 (2d Cir. 1942) ; and one majority opinion,
Treasure Imports, Inc. v. Henry Amdur and Sons, Inc., 127 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1942).
18. This statute is set out in note 4 supra.
19. Barron, The Judicial Code 1948 Revision, 8 F.R.D. 439, 442 (1949) ; Galston,
An Introduction to the New Judicial Code, 8 F.R.D. 201, 205 (1949). Galston was a
member of the Judicial Conference Committee on Revision of the Judicial Code.
Barron was the Chief Reviser of title 28, U.S. Code, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure.
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Musher Foundation v. Alba Trading Co.... (majority and dissenting opinions)."2"
The Revisers intended neither to extend nor limit the pendant jurisdiction doctrine in copyright, patent, and trademark cases beyond that
which was spelled out in Hurn. l They perhaps hoped that the statutory codification when read with the Revisers' Notes would clarify
the ambiguities2 2 which arose from the Hum case's indefinite "cause of
action" test.2" But if the Revisers' intent was simply to adopt Hum
into statutory ' law,
two questions arise. Why did they use the words
"related claim 24 rather than the "single cause of action" terminology
used in Hurn? Which interpretation of Hurn did the Revisers adopt:
the broad doctrine expressed in the Second Circuit dissenting opinions
which call for an overlapping of facts, a fundamental core of facts, to
enable the federal court to entertain jurisdiction of the non-federal
claim ;25 or the narrow identical-issue approach applied by the majority
in the Second Circuit cases ?26
The Revisers did not attempt to resolve these questions. The
reference to piecemeal litigation appears to be an indication of adherence to the liberal interpretation of the Hurn doctrine.27 On the other
hand, the Revisers cited the majority and dissenting opinions of
Musher v. Alba Trading Co." as a good discussion of the jurisdictional
problem in this area, but failed to say which of the opinions if any
they were codifying.
In that case the majority interpreted Hum narrowly and found
that there was no substantial identity of proof showing patent infringement and an unfair competition claim for infringement of commonlaw trademark. They held that the two claims constituted separate
"causes of action," and therefore the federal court had no jurisdiction
over the non-federal unfair competition claim. Judge Clark, dissenting,
wanted to require only a substantial amount of overlapping rather
than a complete identity of issues. He felt this would be procedurally
and economically sound. It may be that through the citation of Musher
the Revisers were expressing their awareness of the diverse interpretations which Hum had received and their determination to leave the
question open for case law development. This conclusion is strengthened
20. Revisers' Notes, supra note 5.
21. See Barron, supra note 19.

22. See the pre-code cases, supra notes 16 and 17.

23. See 4

CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKS

1930-34 (2d ed.

1950), which suggests that this may have been the result of § 1338(b).
24. No attempt will be made in this Note to go into the constitutional arguments
as to the meaning of "claim" summarized below. "Claim" means "cause of action"
in the other sections of the Code, and if § 1338(b) were read as "related cause of
action," it would raise questions as to the constitutionality of the entire section. It
could be argued that federal jurisdiction would be extended over a related but separable
cause of action in violation of Art. III, § 2 of the Constitution, which puts limitations
on the federal judicial power.
25. Musher Foundation, Inc. v. Alba Trading Co. (Clark, J., dissenting), 127 F.2d
9, 11 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 641 (1942).
26. See majority opinion in Second Circuit cases, supra note 17.
27. See MOORE, COMMENTARY ON U.S. JUDICIAL CODE 149-50 (1949); 4 CALLMANN,
UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKS 1931, 1933 (2d ed. 1950).
28. Note 25 supra.
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by the stated intentions of the Revisers to avoid anything of a controversial nature when revising the Code.2"
Because the Revisers left the question open to interpretation by
the different circuits, conflicting views have arisen as to the interpretation of "related" in § 1338(b). The majority of the early decisions
after the enactment of § 1338(b) adopted the narrow interpretation of
Hurn. The courts required that the facts of unfair competition be
substantially identical to those supporting the federal claim." ° These
cases relied directly upon Hurn and did not consider the applicability
of § 1338(b). But even where the courts did 31consider § 1338(b), it
was interpreted according to the narrow view.
The restrictive view was rejected by the majority of the comnientators, who hailed § 1338(b) as a welcome alleviation from the
narrow interpretation Hurn had received in the area. They felt that
the use of the term "related" gave courts an opportunity to depart from
the strict test of "substantially identical facts."' 32 It was urged by one
commentator that in construing § 1338(b), weight should be given
to the Revisers' intentions to avoid piecemeal litigation.3 3 The strict
approach had not been reducing piecemeal litigation and therefore had
not achieved the result which the Revisers had intended. Another
commentator felt that the limiting of piecemeal litigation could be
more readily accomplished through the use of the term "related" than
by requiring identical facts, since many more cases would arise where
a "relation" of issues could be shown than cases with "operative facts
sufficiently identical" to show a "single cause of action."3' 4
In 1952, the Second Circuit in Schreyer v. Ciasco Products Corp.35
intimated that it would adopt the liberal approach by citing Judge
29. Galston, supra note 19, at 205.
30. In Navy Club v. All Navy Club, 85 F. Supp. 679, 681-82 (D.R.I. 1949), a suit
for infringement of a copyrighted emblem and trade name and also for unfair competition was brought by an incorporated organization of former Navy men against
a similar organization. The district court, after examining the respective insignias of
the plaintiff and defendant, decided that there was no copyright infringement but took
jurisdiction of the unfair competition claim because of the "substantial identity of facts."
In Dubil v. Rayford Camp & Co., 184 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1950), the plaintiff owned a
process for preparing meat protected by a patent and the name "Chip Steaks," under
which the process was sold. He sued the defendant for an alleged infringement of his
patent, and as a second cause of action he alleged unfair competition in that the
defendant had simulated the plaintiff's trademark labeled "Chip Steaks." The district
court found no infringement or unfair competition, but the Court of Appeals of the
Ninth Circuit, relying solely on the Hurn "cause of action" test, held that the district
court had no jurisdiction to decide the unfair competition question. The Ninth Circuit
found the facts which established the unfair competition claim were not identical
but presented two separate and distinct causes of action.
31. Lanstrum v. Thorpe, 189 F.2d 46, 51 (8th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
819 (1952). The majority, in interpreting § 1338(b), said: "For such a claim to be
'related' to a case arising under the trademark law within the meaning of the statute
'it must appear that both federal and non-federal causes [of action] rest upon substantially identical facts.' [citing French Renovating Co. v. Ray Renovating Co., 170 F.2d
945 (6th Cir. 1948)]."
32. See 60 HARv. L. Rlv. 424, 430, 431 (1947). See also, MOORE, op. cit. supra
note 27, at 149-50, and CALLMANN, op. cit. supra note 27, at 1931, 1933.
33. I MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcS 658-59 (2d ed. 1964).
34. Wechsler, Federal Jurisdictionand the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 216, 232-40 (1948); see also Note, 20 Gto. WASH. L. REv. 630,
632-38 (1952) and Note, 60 HARV. L. REv. 424, 430-31 (1947).
35. 190 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1951), affirming, 89 F. Supp. 177 (D. Conn. 1950). For a
study of the pre-code Second Circuit cases see Note, 52 YALE L.J. 922 (1943).
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Clark's dissent.86 Since that time the section has received a more
liberal interpretation in most of the federal courts which have considered the problem. 7 These courts have rejected the stringent requirements of "substantially identical facts" and have set out several more
liberal tests. In 1956, the Second Circuit avoided a definite formulation and spoke only of a sufficient interrelation between the two claims. 8
In 1960, a district court required that the "acts of unfair competition
flow from and are unseparately connected with the alleged acts of
patent infringement. 8 9 The Ninth Circuit in 1961 required "a considerable overlap in their factual basis and ... the additional fact that
nearly all the evidence received at the trial . . . was relevant to both
claims."4 Recently, the Ninth Circuit said that "the term 'related'
refers to probative facts; it means that part of the proof in support of
one claim be common to the other."'"
The salient feature of all of these tests is the intention of the
courts to avoid piecemeal litigation whenever possible. Though some
of the tests appear to be more liberal than others, all would require
a certain degree of relationship between the federal and non-federal
claims, i.e., an overlapping of evidence between the two claims. These
tests necessarily require that the trial judge must often defer his decision
on the jurisdictional question until at least some of the evidence in
the case has been presented. In view of the underlying policy of
§ 1338(b) to avoid piecemeal litigation and judicial effort, it is to be
hoped that such deferrals will be avoided where possible or decided
early in trial when some deferral is necessary.
In the present River Brand Rice Mills case, the Fifth Circuit
announced its support for the liberal interpretation of § 1338(b),
although it left the district court to decide whether the federal and
non-federal claims were "related" in this particular case. 42 The court
cited I. I. Case Co. v. Borrack, 48 a case which did not involve § 1338(b).
as indicating "a continuing liberal trend respecting joinder of federal
and non-federal claims in a closely related jurisdictional area."** This
36. 89 F. Supp. at 178. See also Cutting Room Appliance Corp. v. Empire Cutting
Machine Co., 186 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1951); Kaplan v. Henenhart Novelty Co., 182
F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1950) ; but see Kleinman v. Betty Dain Creations, Inc., 189 F.2d 546
(2d Cir. 1951).
37. Wham-O-Mfg. Co. v. Paradise Mfg. Co., 327 F.2d 748 (9th Cir. 1964)
O'Brien v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 293 F.2d 1, 12-13 (3d Cir. 1961); Pursche v.
Atlas Scraper & Engineering Co., 300 F.2d 467, 483-84 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 911 (1962); Lyon v. Quality Courts United, 249 F.2d 790, 795 (6th Cir.
1957) ; Iowa Farmers Union v. Farmers' Educational & Coop. U., 247 F.2d 809, 818-19
(8th Cir. 1957) ; Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d .538
(2d Cir. 1956).
38. Bullock v. Sears Roebuck Co., 239 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1956).
39. Steigele v. Bentley and Schibelle Trading Co., 214 F. Supp. 364, 366 (D.
Ariz. 1960).
40. Pursche v. Atlas Scraper & Engineering Co., 300 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 911 (1962), quoting in part from Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your
Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1956).
41. Wham-O-Mfg. Co. v. Paradise Mfg. Co., 327 F.2d 748, at 752 n.5 (9th
Cir. 1964).
42. 334 F.2d at 773.
43. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
44. 334 F.2d at 773 n.8. The Fourth Circuit would most likely adopt the more
liberal view. In General Shoe Corp. v. Rosen, 111 F. 2d 95, 99 (4th Cir. 1940), the
court cited the liberal cases and held that the allegations of an infringement complaint
gave the federal court jurisdiction with power to deal with all grounds supporting
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decision, together with the other recent cases favoring a liberal construction of the word "related" in § 1338(b), points to a definite tendency toward allowing federal courts to entertain jurisdiction over nonfederal unfair competition claims.45
Because copyright, patent, and trademark infringement cases are
exclusively within federal jurisdiction,4" a litigant will be unable to
avoid piecemeal litigation by pressing his federal and non-federal claim
in a state court. It is this consideration which compels a liberal interpretation of "related" rather than the narrower, pre-Schreyer construction of the term.47 It may also be this consideration which led the
Revisers to use the term "related claim" rather than the specific terminology used in Hurn.* If any weight at all is to be given to the
Revisers' expressed intention to avoid piecemeal litigation, the courts
must adopt the liberal interpretation as the only rational approach.

plaintiff's claim, including a claim for injunction against unfair competition. Though
the case was decided prior to the passage of § 1338(b), one can infer from the case that
the Fourth Circuit will follow the liberal interpretation of the section.
45. In cases where infringement and unfair competition claims are joined, it is
almost inevitable that the federal court will grant jurisdiction under the liberal interpretation of "related," which rejects the notion that non-federal and federal claims
must rely upon identical facts. Note, 62 COL. L. R-v. 1018, 1932 n.73 (1962).
See also Note, 60 HARV. L. Rtv. 424, 430-31 (1947), which expressed concern that
§ 1338(b) might be construed to exclude joinder of non-federal claims in cases other
than those involving patents, copyrights, and trademarks.
46. 28 U.S.C. 1338(a) (1958).
47. See Musher Foundation, Inc. v. Alba Trading Co. (Clark, J., dissenting), 127
F.2d 9, 11 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 641 (1942), which states that, "[I]f the
roast must be reserved exclusively for the federal bench, it is anomalous to send the
gravy across the street to the state court house." See also Clark, The Code Cause
of Action, 33 YALE L.J. 817 (1924); Clark, The Cause of Action, 82 U. PA. L. Rgv.
354 (1934).
48. See Note, 62 CoL. L. REv. 1018, 1034 (1962).

